Abstract-This paper presents a new approach of dynamic symmetric key distribution for encrypting the communication between two nodes in a Wireless Sensor Network. The distribution of a shared key can be performed by any sensor node and does not always require that it is performed by the base station. Each node can be selected by one of its neighbor nodes in order to distribute a pair-wise key for a communication between two nodes. The selection is based on the local computation of a trust value granted by the requesting nodes. This paper also describes a dynamic trust-based route selection mechanism that each node performs to route data to any destination. [2] . To minimize these security issues, this paper proposes an efficient dynamic distribution mechanism of pair-wise keys based on the notion of local trust. Any node in the WSN can be selected by one of its neighbor nodes in order to distribute a pair-wise key for encrypting the communication between two nodes. Establishing a trust context will ensure that only trusted nodes within the WSN can share sensed information and more important, that current communication is reliable: it allows the detection of possible intruders or weak nodes under attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) consists of spatially distributed autonomous nodes called sensors that monitor physical or environmental conditions, such as temperature or pressure at different locations [1] . They are used in a variety of applications, such as climate sensing and control in office buildings. The privacy and security issues posed by WSNs are currently crucial issues of WSN research [2] . To minimize these security issues, this paper proposes an efficient dynamic distribution mechanism of pair-wise keys based on the notion of local trust. Any node in the WSN can be selected by one of its neighbor nodes in order to distribute a pair-wise key for encrypting the communication between two nodes. Establishing a trust context will ensure that only trusted nodes within the WSN can share sensed information and more important, that current communication is reliable: it allows the detection of possible intruders or weak nodes under attack.
This paper also describes a dynamic trust-based route selection mechanism, that each node performs to route data to neighbor nodes (that it shares a key with) and to the BS.
Section II describes our shared-key distribution protocol and explains how our approach is different from existing approaches of pair-wise key distribution performed by the BS. 1 The full version of this paper will be available at: http://eprints.otago.ac.nz/728/. This work has been supported by the University of Otago Research Grant: ORG 0107-0308.
Section III explains the dynamic trust-based routing protocol. Section IV explains the reward and punishment mechanism that has been added to the routing protocol to adjust the trust based on the nodes' behavior, and finally in Section V, we provide a description of future work and discussion.
II. THE SHARED-KEY DISTRIBUTION PROTOCOL

A. Neighbor-based shared-key distribution 1) BS vs. neighbor-based shared key distribution
There are many ways of defining trust [7] [8]. We define the notion of two "trusted" nodes as two nodes that share a private unique symmetric key and as far as each of them are aware, both nodes have not been compromised. Trusted nodes can be immediate neighbors in the radio range of the requesting node or multi-hop nodes not in the radio range. There are already several papers about using the BS to create keys that pairs of nodes share to talk to each other [3] [4] [6] . In all of these works, the basic idea is that each node has a unique symmetric key with the BS and every time that a node A wants to talk to node B, it asks the BS for some information about node B. For example, with Kerberos [5] , BS may return a message confirming that node B is trusted and proof that node A can show to node B so that node B knows that it can trust node. From our reading of the different works dealing with pairwise key distributions in sensor networks, it has been observed that they all require the nodes to communicate with the BS. This means that in terms of communication cost, if each node has d neighbors (d is the average degree 2 of nodes) and there are N nodes in the WSN, then the cost to set up all pair-wise keys between all neighboring nodes will be N.d communications between the BS and the nodes. This creates a large amount of network traffic not desirable in a WSN. An argument that differentiates our approach is that not every node has to check with the BS before it can set up a pair-wise key with a new neighbor, if it can get the key directly from one of its already trusted neighbors. Consider the case where, the BS already trusts A, B and C. A and B are allocated a private unique pair-wise symmetric key (K AB ) by communicating with the BS, as are A and C (K AC ). Instead of requesting the BS to provide a key when B and C want to communicate, they can be allocated their new pair-wise symmetric key by communicating with A, without the need to check with the BS.
It works as follows: Node B wants to communicate with node C. B sends a message to all of its trusted immediate neighbors asking them if they trust C. If a trusted neighbor A replies that it does, B then asks A to allocate them a new pairwise symmetric key K BC , similarly to the direct communication with the BS. If no neighbors reply, B has no option but to ask the BS (perhaps through multiple hops) to allocate the key.
Theoretically, the cost of communications could be improved by a factor of d (N communications with the BS needed instead of N.d). Initially, each node needs to establish a pair-wise key with one other neighbor via the BS. Later, a pair of nodes can establish a pair-wise key via any trusted neighbor that they have in common. Considering the physical distribution of nodes, most nodes are far away from the BS. Rather than having the majority of nodes using multi-hop communications to establish keys with each of their immediate neighbors, they only once need to use long distance multi-hop communication to set up their first local trust relationship. Then all further trust relationships are established with single-hop communications (immediate neighbor).
2) Calculating the initial trust
Suppose that we have 3 sensor nodes A, B and C. Node A is the allocator of the key between B and C and has trust values TN A B and TN A C, we need to calculate the initial trust between B and C. B has a trust value TN B A . C has a trust value TN C A . B can calculate the new trust value TN B C using TN B A and TN A C using some local function. In our approach we simply multiplying the values together, i.e. 
3) Protocol description
At the beginning of shared-key distribution protocol, each node sends a Hello message. Nodes that hear a Hello message record the address of the sending node in their Neighbor table. A BS that receives a Hello message will immediately send a Key message to that node. This Key message informs the node that the BS is within radio range. Once any node has a route to a BS, it begins to look through its list of neighbors for any neighbor that it does not yet have a shared pair-wise key. In a standard Kerberos-based [5] system, the node would then ask the BS for a pair-wise key that it can use to securely communicate with that neighbor (the "target"). Here instead, the requester node will send out an Allocator Request message. If any immediate neighbor shares pair-wise keys with both, the requester and the target then that neighbor (the "allocator") can reply with an Allocator Reply message. If no neighbor replies to the Allocator Request message before a timer has expired then the requester has no choice other than to send a Key Request to its BS (note that each node must have at least one key allocated to it via a BS before it can begin requesting keys with other neighbors). However if an Allocator Reply message is received then the requester can send a Key Request message directly to allocator. When a node or BS receives a Key Request message, it generates a new random key and sends it to the requester in a Key Reply message. The requester receives and records the new pairwise key and creates a Key message that it sends to the target, including a copy of the token that was in the Key Reply message. The Key message is received by the target and it can use the token to verify that the new pair-wise key came from the trusted allocator.
B. Simulation, results and analysis
The neighbor-based key distribution has been simulated using the OMNet++ simulator [9] in C++. To measure the efficiency of the algorithm, simulations were run to record the total number of packets sent by all nodes. These include Hello messages, Allocator Request and Reply messages (of which there are none when the BS performs all key allocations), Key Request and Key Reply messages (counted once for each hop from the source to the destination) and Key messages.
We compared the neighbor-based shared-key distribution to distribution of pair-wise keys performed only by the BS. In our simulations, we had one BS in the center of a square region which contained randomly scattered nodes. The size of the area was increased in proportion to the number of nodes to keep a consistent average node density. The experiments were repeated with average node degrees of 10 and 15. Each simulation ended when all nodes had acquired pair-wise keys with every one of their radio range neighbors. Each result is the average of 100 iterations (Fig. 1) , and for all averages, the standard deviation varied between 2.97 and 8.50. The objective of using the neighbor-based shared-key distribution scheme was to reduce the number of transmissions required while forwarding additional Key Request and Key Reply messages to and from the BS. The cost of this is the number of transmissions required to find out if an immediate neighbor would be able to perform the key allocation, rather than having to ask a BS. Fig. 1 shows that when there are a small number of nodes, the overhead of Allocator Request and Allocator Reply packets exceeded the savings from reduced Key Request and Key Reply forwarding. Nodes that are only a few hops away from the BS send more transmissions with the proposed scheme than with the BS distribution scheme. But the proposed scheme scales well with increasing network size. As the number of nodes increases, the proportion of nodes that are far away from the BS increases. Beyond a certain size, our method may be able to give a substantial performance increase which is appropriate for many applications of WSNs. The threshold and savings depend on the average node density. From these results, we can see that the lower the density, the smaller the network size needs to be before we begin to see the benefits of using our algorithm: around 125 nodes when d=10 and around 300 nodes when d=15.
III. DYNAMIC TRUST-BASED ROUTING PROTOCOL
A. Routing behavior
In a simple WSN, data is routed from the nodes to the BS and global maintenance messages are flooded from a BS to the nodes. When a node sends a request for information to the BS a route must be maintained to allow the reply to be sent back. In more complex situations a node may wish to send a message to a specific node, perhaps for data aggregation.
We expect our algorithm to exhibit the following properties:
• If a route will not succeed (there is some node on the route that has an attributed trust value of 0.0) then nodes will not use that route.
• The algorithm should avoid loops when a node is selecting a new route.
• The algorithm should minimize the overhead of route and trust information that nodes are transmitting to maintain trusted routes to the BS.
B. Computing the trust and cost of a route
Node A use Formulas (1) and (2) to computes the trust TR A B BS and cost CR A B BS of a route through node B to BS (the destination may also be any node other than the BS) by combining the trust TN A B (trust that node A grants to node B) and CN A B (cost to transmit directly to B) that it has for node B with the trust TR B BS and cost CR B BS that node B has broadcast (see Fig. 2 ). 
1) Choosing between two routes
A node chooses a route according to the cost of a route as well as its trust of the route. Cost can have any value 0. For simplicity, the cost for transmission from one node to an immediate neighbor is 1 in our simulations, but any metric may be used, such as latency or the radio power required to reach the neighbor. A node wishes to minimize the cost while maximizing the trust of the route it chooses to use. Suppose that node A is given the choice between two routes (to the BS or any other node). For simplicity we call these routes R B and R C with trust values TR B and TR C and costs CR B and CR C respectively; there are four cases to consider:
• If TR B =TR C and CR B =CR C then the previously selected route is maintained.
• If TR B =TR C then choose the cheaper route.
• If CR B = CR C then choose the more trusted route.
• If one route is more trusted and cheaper than the other route then choose that route.
• If TR B > TR C and CR B > CR C then the node must decide if it is more important to find a more reliable route or a cheaper one. The choice should depend on both criteria.
According to Equation (3), we propose to take the trust and cost of two routes and compare the cost of trying and failing with one route vs. trying and failing with the other. Let E B be the Expenditure of choosing R B . Then E B is calculated as:
We assume that (1-TR B ) is proportional to the probability that using route R B fails.
Similarly, E C =CR C + (1-TR C ).CR B (4) Comparing E B to E C , the route with the smaller Expenditure (E) is chosen by A.
We can test the formula and see that we get the same result as earlier:
• If TR B =TR C , the cheapest will always have a smaller E.
• If CR B =CR C , the most trusted will always have a smaller E.
• If one route is more trusted and cheaper than the other route then the E will always be smaller for this route.
2) Choosing between more than two routes
We can compare all "pairs" of available routes using the method listed above. But what happens if there is no overall best route, e.g. A is given the choice between three routes R B , R C and R D where E B < E C , E C < E D and E D < E B ? We have tested this empirically and found that for all possible values of TR B , TR C , TR D , CR B , CR C and CR D there is always one route that has a smaller E when compared with the other two routes, except in trivial cases such as when two or more routes have the same TR and CR or when CR B = CR C = CR D = 0.
In order to compare all the routes to find the best one, a node doesn't need to compare all pairs. It only needs to compare two routes and discard the route with the higher Expenditure until it has eliminated all but one route, which is its best choice.
3) Avoiding loops Our method of selecting a route to use does not guarantee that loops do not occur. When node A changes the trust or cost for a neighbor or route, it would immediately choose a new best route from all those it has available. But the best available route may contain node A. Such situations occur because the change in trust or cost needs to be transferred to node A's neighbors, which would then be aggregated into their route trust and cost values and then transmitted back. Even then there is a potential for loops to occur due to synchronization. To prevent these problems, the node sends a Route Test message before using or broadcasting an updated route. The Route Test message is sent to the destination using the route to be tested. If a node or BS receives a Route Test message then it replies with a Route Confirm message. If a Route Confirm message is received then the node can start using that route and transmit a Route Update message to all neighbors. If a Route Test message comes back to the node that it originated from then the node knows that using that route will cause a loop, so it excludes that route and chooses a new best route from those it has available. We implemented our algorithm and ran a number of simulations. The results will be available in the full version of this paper.
IV. REWARD AND PUNISHMENT
A good behavior is defined as a behavior that improves the efficiency and integrity of the network, while a bad behavior is the opposite. An example of good behavior is when a node is forwarding consistent packets of data received from neighbors to other nodes. An example of bad behavior is when a node is failing to forward packets of data (either through its own fault or the fault of other nodes further down the route), indicating a malfunction or potentially an attack.
Good or bad behavior adds or subtracts certain amounts of trust depending upon the expected frequency and severity of the events according to Equation (5) .
where p bad|good is the probability that a node is deemed to have misbehaved when it was really being good (false alarm rate for this node), p good|good is the probability that a node is deemed to have been good when being good; and ΔT bad is the amount that trust is reduced when bad behavior is suspected (punishment), and ΔT good is the increase in trust if good behavior is suspected (reward). p bad|good and p good|good sum to 1 and are a property of the network. We expect that p bad|good will be much smaller than p good|good and as a result ΔT bad will be much bigger than ΔT good . Consequently, trust will slowly climb to a relatively high value through the course of normal interactions between nodes. If bad behavior from a real malicious node is detected, then trust granted by its neighbors will quickly fall to zero.
V. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
A. The neighbor-based shared-key distribution
One security issue about our scheme it that a node that allocates keys will have access to that key and may use it maliciously. Our scheme makes the assumption that if a node is trusted it should not act maliciously by storing keys that it has distributed, but it will immediately forget them.
Also, suppose that a trustworthy node A allocates the key K BC and immediately "forgets" the key K BC. Later, if A is compromised, an attacker may be able to use the keys K AB and K AC to decode the messages that A sent when allocating K BC , thus being able to read any message transmitted using the link BC, including any key allocation messages that are sent via BC. This effect can be minimized by revoking keys allocated by un-trusted nodes.
B. The dynamic trust-based routing protocol
In our protocol, nodes immediately send an ack packet after they receive a packet of data. If C wants to send data to BS via B then it transmits and waits for the ack from B. If it gets the ack then it can increase its trust of B. If it doesn't get the ack then it could temporarily set its trust of B to 0. When it hears from B it will return its trust of B back to the previous value minus some amount based on how long B was absent.
